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to maintain a flat age-wealth profile, rather than buy individual life
annuities, stands in contrast to central implications of the standard
life—cycle model of consumption—saving behavior. The analysis in this
paper lends support to an explanation for this phenomenon based either
on the cost of annuities, importantly including the element of that cost
due to adverse selection, or on the interaction of that cost and an
intentionalbequest motive.
Expected yields offered on individual life annuities in the United
States are lower by some 4-6%, or 2 1/2-4 1/2% after allowing for
adverse selection, than yields on alternative long—term fixed—income
investments. Simulations of an extended model of life-cycle saving and
portfolio behavior, allowing explicitly for uncertain lifetimes and
Social Security, show that yield differentials in this range can account
for the observed behavior, even in the absence of a bequest motive, during
the early years of retirement. By contrast, at older ages the combination
of yield differentials in this range and a positive bequest motive is
necessary to do so.
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TEE COST OF ANNUITIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR SAVING BEHAVIOR AND BEOUESTS
Benjamin M. Friedman and MarkWarshawsky*
It is common experience that as we grow older
and nearerto eternity we become more, not less, anxious
about money. Derek Brewer, Chaucer and His World (p. 213).
Itis startling, at least for economists 'fno viewconsumption—
savingbehavior within the ftamerk of the familiar life cycle model,
to confront the fact that in theUnited Statesfew individuals purchase
life annuities. According to the life cycle model, the chief principle
governing individual saving behavior is the desire to smooth consumption
patternsover one' s lifetime, within the constraints imposed by limited
lifetime resources.1 Despite ample evidence of such smoothing behavior
with respect to short-run income fluctuations, age-wealth profiles show
little if any tendency for elder individuals to dissave out of available
resources as their remaining life expectancy shortens.2 This behavior would
beunderstandable in terms of the standard life cycle model with risk—
averse individuals uncertain about their length of life, only if annuity
markets did not exist. Without access to life annuities, elder individuals
would conserve wealth to self—insure against the risk of having to reduce
consumption in later years if their life span turns out to be unexpectedly
long.3 Well-developed markets for life annuities do exist in the United
States, howeve'r. The puzzle is that so few people choose to usethem.4
Someof the potential answers to this puzzle bear important implications
not only for the theory of consumption—saving behavior but also for major
issues of public policy. Perhaps the most obvious possibility is that iflst
peoplesave (or, in old age, choose not to dissave) not for motives related
to the usual life cycle reasoning but, instead, to leave bequests to their—2—
heirs.5 Althoughataformal levelit is easy enough to modify the life
cycle modeltoincorporate a bequest motive, the two rationales for saving
have strongly differing implications. If saving to fund intentional
bequests accounts for a large share of actual wealth holding, then familiar
life cycle conclusions, on issues as diverse as the efficacy of tax
incentives for capital formation and the economic effects of Social Security,
mayno longer hold.
Analternative explanation for the lack of participation in the
annuity market is that most individuals automatically receive life
annuitiesfrom SocialSecurity and,foran increasing fraction of the labor
force,employer-sponsored pension plans. Nevertheless, itisdifficult to
believe that the combination of Social Security and private pension coverage
so precisely matches each individual's preferences for annuity holding
as to leave only minimal individual annuity demand remaining. Moreover,
although both Social Security and private pension coverage have grown
enormously just within recent decades, the minimal extent of individual
life annuity purchases in theUnited States is apparently a phenosnon
of long standing.
A more plausible explanation,which again relegates intentional
bequests to a minor role and thereby rescues the life cycle model and its
implications, is that people shun individual annuities because they are not
priced "fairly" in the actuarial sense. A "load factor," depressing the
yield on an annuity below the corresponding actuarially fair yield, could
reflect ordinary transactions costs (including taxes and a competitive
return to the annuity issuer's capital at risk) ,monopolyprofits earned
by annuity issuers in imperfectly competitive markets, or as discussed
at some length below —adverseselection among annuity purchasers.—3—
Whateverits source, such a differential between the implicit expected
yield on annuities and the available yield on alternative forms of
wealth holding would clearly discourage annuity purchases. In the limit,
if the differential were large enough, standard models of consumption-
savingbehavior without annuity markets could again apply.
The object of this paper is to examine the pricing of individual
lifeannuities in the United States, and to infer from the observed
market price structure the respective roles of actuarially unfair annuity
prices and the intentional bequest motive in explaining the puzzle that
so few individuals actually purchase such annuities. More specifically,
the questions addressed here are, first, how large the yield differential
actually is on readily available individual life annuities and, second,
whethertheobservedyielddifferential is large enough to discourage a
typicallyrisk-averse elder individual from buying annuities in the absence
of a positive bequest motive.In light of the great attention devoted to
annuitiesin the theoretical literature of consumption—saving behavior,
together with the potential importance of actuarially unfair annuity prices
in explaining the observed behavior, it is surprising that (to the authors'
knowledge) no one has previouslyexamined these data and their implications.
SectionI presents data on the implicit yield on individual life
annuities in the United States during 1968-83, and compares these yields
tothose on alternative long—term fixed-income investment vehicles to
measure the effective cost of annuities. Section II, drawing on the work of
Fischer (1973) ,describesa model representing the consumption-saving and
portfolio allocation behavior of an individual with uncertain lifetime,
who has access to a life annuity market but (in general) also values bequests.
Section III uses simulations of this model, based on observed annuity yield—4—
differentials, to draw inferences about the respective roles of annuity
costs and a bequest motive in accounting for the typical individual's
preferences for maintaining a flat age-wealth profile instead of buying
annuities. Section IV briefly summarizes the paper's principal findings.—5—
I.Yields on Individual Life Annuities
Table 1 presents calculations of the expected yields on individual
life annuities offered in the United States, during 1968—83, based on
annuity premiums quoted in successive issues of the A.M. Best Flitcraft
Compend.6 The premium underlying each reported calculation is that
quoted for a single-premium immediate annuity for 65-year—old males.
The assumed mortality probabilities underlying these calculations are
the general population mortality probabilities for 65-year-old males
reported in the 1970 and 1980 U.S. Life Tables, adjusted by a factor ot
.985 to reflect the 1.5% annual improvement in U.S. male mortality
probabilities that has occurred over the last two decades, and by a
further factor of .9925 to reflect the assumption of a future 0.75% annual
improvement in male mortality probabilities for all ages.7
The first column of Table 1 indicates the expected yield calculated
from the mean premium charged on this basic annuity contract by the ten
largest insurance companies in the United States. These data are probably
the most relevant for analyzing economy—wide individual behavior. The
largest insurers usually do business in all regions of the country, so
that the typical 65-year-old U.S. male has access to annuities at thLs
mean premium with little or no search costs. The associated expected
yield has risen over time as market interest rates have risen, although the
expected annuity yield has consistently remained well below the contemporary
yields on readily available fixed—income investments. This simple comparison
does not indicate that annuities are a 'dominated asset," however,
because the lifetime guarantee provided by an annuity is not available from
other investment vehicles.
The remaining columns of Table 1 indicate the potential returns toTABLE 1
YIELD EQUIVALENT OF INDIVIDUAL LIFE ANNUITIES
Ten Largest Insurers Complete
Sample
Mean High Low High
1968 2.25% 2.60% 1.90% 2.75%
1969 2.58 3.03 2.18 3.18
1970 2.91 3.76 2.31 4.06
1971 3.27 4.27 2.42 4.27
1972 3.36 4.11 2.51 4.11
1973 3.62 4.22 2.82 4.22
1974 3.85 4.50 3.25 4.55
1975 4.29 4.89 3.74 4.89
1976 4.61 5.21 3.86 5.66
1977 4.67 5.07 4.07 5.57
1978 4.73 5.13 4.13 5.68
1979 4.78 5.23 4.18 6.18
1980 5.29 6.29 4.54 6.84
1981 5.92 6.72 5.02 8.42
1982 6.57 9.37 5.07 12.17
1983 6.80 8.85 5.13 10.65
Notes: Calculations assume general population mortality probabilities.
Calculations are for 65-year—old-males.—6-
market search by showing the dispersion of expected yields calculated
from the premiums charged for this same basic contract by different
insurers.9 The second and third columns show data for the highest and
lowest expected yields on this contract offered by any of the ten largest
insurers. Presumably most 65—year—old males have access to the highest
yields in this group at only modest search cost. The final column of the
table shows the highest expected yield on this contract offered by any
of the fifty—odd insurers in Best's sample. Because the smaller companies
in the sample do not necessarily maintain sales forces in all parts
of the country, however, there is no presumption that the typical
65—year-old male has ready access to this complete-sample highest yield.
If all individuals had identical mortality probabilities, the
spread between the calculated expected yields shown in Table 1
and some reference yield reflecting the typical individual's opportunity cost
would indicate the effective cost to the individual of the risk avoidance
that annuities provide. In fact, however, many individuals have
information that leads them to expect either a shorter or a longer life
than the population—wide average, By contrast, insurers typically
charge a uniform premium to all individuals of the same age and sex,
presumably because information about individual mortality probabilities
is too costly, or perhaps even impossible, to obtain and use. Individuals
expecting longer (shorter) than average lifespans will therefore perceive
that life annuities bear higher (lower) expected yields, and hence will
10
be more (less) likely to buy them.This adverse selection —adverse
from the viewpoint of the insurer, that is —willlead to underwriting
losses if the insurer continues to charge a premium that is actuarially
fair to the population as a whole.—7—
Table 2 therefore presents analogous calculations of the expected
yields on the same basic annuity contract for a 65-year-old male, based
on the same annuity premiums as before, but now based on alternative
mortality probabilities compiled from the actual company experience
on individual life annuity contracts issued in the United States during
1971—75, again adjusted as indicated abovetoreflect the improvement
in mortality probabilities.11 Figure 1 indicates the extent to which
the sub-population who choose to buy annuities in fact have a greater
survival probability than the general population. Because of this greater
life expectancy, the expected yields shown in Table 2 are greater than
thecorresponding values shown inTable 1, based on general population
mortalityprobabilities. Nevertheless, even these greater expected yields
resultingfrom the actual company experience mortality probabilities are
still lower than the contemporary yields on readily available alternative
forms of wealth holding. Hence even the sub—population who voluntarily
buy annuities still face a negative yield differential repreenting the
cost of the protection from risk that the annuity provides.
Table 3 summarizes the cost of this basic annuity contract by
showing the 1968-83 mean values of the differential between the
expected yields shown in Tables 1 and 2 and two different market interest
rates: the 20-year U.S. government bond yield and the average yield
on corporate debt directly placed with insurance companies. From the
standpoint of an individual's opportunity cost of funds, the (lower)
yield on U.S. Government bonds is more relevant if the individual has no
better investment vehicle available. Increasingly, however, U.S. financial
intermediaries have offered individuals ways of buying shares in pools
of less liquid but higher—yielding assets.TABLE 2
YIELD EQUIVALENT OF LIFE ANNUITIES: ANNUITY PURCHASERS ONLY
Ten Largest Insurers Complete
Sample
Mean High Low High
1968 4.25% 4.60% 3.85% 4.70%
1969 4.53 4.98 4.13 5.13
1970 4.81 5.66 4.21 5.96
1971 5.17 6.07 4.27 6.07
1972 5.21 5.96 4.36 5.96
1973 5.47 6.07 4.67 6.07
1974 5.65 6.35 5.05 6.35
1975 6.04 6.69 5.49 6.69
1976 6.36 6.96 5.61 7.41
1977 6.42 6.82 5.82 7.32
1978 6.48 6.88 5.83 7.38
1979 6.43 6.93 5.88 7.88
1980 6.94 7.94 6.19 8.49
1981 7.57 8.37 6.62 10.12
1982 8.17 11.12 6.67 13.82
1983 8.40 10.45 6.75 12.30
Note: Calculations are for 65-year—old males.



















































Note: Calculations arefor65-year—old males.—8—
The resulting average yield differentials shown in Table 3 range
from a minimum (in absolute value) of -.95%for the highest expected
yield offered by any company in Best's sample, compared to the Government
bond yield and based on actual company experience mortality probabilities,
to a maximum of -6.90% for the lowest yield offered by any of the ten
largest insurers, compared to the direct placement yield and based on
general population mortality probabilities. The differentials in the
table that are probably most relevant for studying economy—wide
individual behavior are those shown in the first row, for the mean expected
yield offered by the ten largest insurers, compared to the yield on
either Government bonds or direct placements, and based on either
general population or company experience mortality probabilities. These
differentials range from -2.43% to -6.13% —largevalues from some
perspectives, but not, for example, in comparison to the yield differential
that most individuals incur in holding money balances.
The question at issue here is whether these differentials are
sufficient to account for the preference for maintaining a flat age—wealth
profile over purchasing life annuities observed among the elderly population
in the United States. Since it is impossible to answer this question
on a purely empirical basis, some more formal.analyticalapproach is
necessary. Section II develops a suitable framework for analysis, and
Section III applies this framework in the context of the observed yield
differentials reported here.—9—
II.A Model of Saving and 2nnuity Demand
Themodel developed here to analyze the demand for individual life
annuities in the context of life cycle saving and a bequest motive is an
annuity analog of Fischer's (1973) model of the demand for life insurance,
generalizedto incorporate fixed mandatory holdings of socially provided
annuities.12 Following Fischer, it is useful to represent the individual's
decision problem in this expanded life cycle context as the maximization
of expected lifetime utility
w-x-l
E(U)= [PtUt(ct)+ (1)
where w is the assumedmaximumlengthoflife, x is the individual's age
as of time t=O, Pt is the probability that an ind.ividual of agex att=O
will be alive at any time t>O, q1 is the (conditional) probability that
such an individual who was alive at time t woulddieat time t+l)3
Ut(Ct) is utility received fromconsuntion Cat timet,and Vt÷i(Gt+i) is
utility received from (anticipation of) a bequest G at time t+l. Again
following Fischer, it is convenient to specify the two utility functions








whereis the pratt—Arrow coefficient of relative risk aversion, a is the
timepreferenceparameter, and bt (in comparison to at) indicates the
relativeutility attached to bequests left in period
The usual life cycle specification of behavior with no bequest motive
is therefore justthespecial case of this model with btO for all t>O. In—10-
general, however, peoplemayvalue bequests, andtheymay value them
differentlyat differenttimes. For example, Yaari (1965) has suggested
that bt follows a hump-shaped pattern, with higher values during the
years when family dependency is important, and either level or declining
values during retirement years when children have typically become
financially independent,
The individual's problem is then to maximize (1), subject to a
giveninitial wealth position and toa nonnegativity constraint on
wealthin each subsequent time period, giventhemenu of available
investment opportunities (including any mandatory holding of socially
provided annuities) and their respective yields.15 In each period the
individual must decide not only how much of current wealthtoconsume but
also how to allocate the remainder among the available investment vehicles.
Thespecific asset menu considered here includes a riskiess one—period
bond bearing gross rate of return Rt, a one—period social annuity bearing
S gross rate of returntosurvivors,and aone—period marketannuity
bearing gross rate of returnto survivors)6 Both annuities are
actuarially fair —thatis, there is no expected yield differential for
either—if
S A 4) =÷1)Q = Rt.
With little relevant loss of generality, it isalsoconvenient to set Rt
constant at R for all t>0.
Thedynamic programming solution to this problem proceedsfrom the
final period t=w-x-l, in which the certainty of death at theend of the
period (q=l) simplifies the problem of anindividual who has survived to
that date to merely choosing C1 to maximizethe sum of utility from current
consumptionUwx_l(Cw_x_i) and utilityfrom bequests Vwx(Gwx), subject to—11—
then—remainingwealth W andtheconstraint w-x-1
GR(W-c w-x w-x-lw-x-l
Giventhe iso—elastic utilities assuud in (2) and (3),the solution is
just








and the corresponding indirect utility function




i w—x—i1 =w—x—l l— (9)
where
o = (10) w—x—l w—x—l
Theconsunption decision (5)represents the entire solution for t=w—x—l,
sincein that period the availability of annuities is irrelevant to the
analysis.
The dynamic programming solution next proceeds to the individuai 's
optisal consuztption andportfoliodecisions for the irmnediatelyprior period,
given wealth remainingat that time.nindividual alive at t=w-x—2 will die
at the end of that period with probability q1•Hencethe relevant—12—
inaxirnand governing the decisions to be taken as of t=w—x-2 is U (C
w—x—2 w—x—2
plus the bequest motive V (G) with orobability and the
w—x—l w—x—l w—x—l
indirect utility function in (9) with probability (l-1). The indirect




1—lB+ (l—q1)cS1 1—lB C2 A2
A S • [R(l-A-s) + 0 A + 0 S w—x-2 w-x-2 w-x-2 wx-2 w—x-2 w—x-2
(w C 1-lB
+ b •w—x—2-w—x—2 •[R(l—A
— )]lB (U)
w—x—1 w—x--2 w—x—2
where A and S are the proportions of saving (W-C) invested in market
annuities and (mandatorily) in social annuities, respectively. The usual
life cycle model with no market for annuities is therefore just the special
case represented by At=O for all t>0 (and, if there are no social annuities
either, S=0 for all t>O also)17
The first—order conditions for (11) then give the optimal values of
consumption and purchases of market annuities at t=w—x—2 as









(1—q )ctS (Q -x-1 w-x-1 w-x-2- R)
—sw- x- 2 (13)—13—
and the corresponding value of the indirect utilityfunction as





k =[c (R(l-A-s + A + s
w—x—2 w—x—1 w—x-2 w—x—2 -w—x—2 w—x—2 w—x—2 w—x--2
+b (R(1-A -s))l]l (16) w—x—2 w—x—2
The remainder of the dynamic programming solution proceeds backward
to the initial period t=O. in an analogous way. The expressions for
each period's optimal consumption and purchases of market annuities, and
for each period's value of the indirect utility function, are of the same
form (but with subscripts adjusted accordingly) as (12), (13) and (14),
respectively. Because the analytical properties of the model are not
sufficientto address the more quantitative questions that are the focus
of this paper, however, Section III proceeds with numerical simulations of
the model under several different sets of assumptions about the crucial
bequest motive parameter and the cost of private annuities.—14—
III. Simulation Results
The model developed in Section II generates lifetime streams of
consumption and annuity purchase values that are optimal for given
values of parameters describing preferences (,cand b) ,themarket
environment (R, and 2S) and mortality probabilities (p and q). The
principal focus of interest in this paper is on one aspect of preferences
and one aspect of the market environment —thebequest motive and the
cost (yield) of market annuities, respectively.
The strategy adopted here for representing the bequest motive
is simply to asunsne that the correspondence between bt in (3) and c
in (2) is just
= 0, t=O,...,35 (17)
where B is a non—age-specific parameter indicating the individual's
life—long preference for bequests relative to current consumption,
given the other paraitters of the model, including in particular the
interest rate (R) ,thecurvature of the utility function (), and—
becauseB implicitly gives the relative weight of a stock (the bequest)
versusa flow (consumption) —theassumed time unit of analysis. Given
B, the bequest amount is larger as R is higher, and smaller asis higher.
For example, from (5)-(7) and (17), etakesthe value (G/C) w—x w—x—l
where(G/C )isjust the ratio of the final-period bequest to the
w—x w—x—l
prior—period consumption. The normally limiting case for altruistic
bequests, in which an individual provides for his heirs' consumption at
the same level as his own, indicates (l/R—1) 35/R as the logical upper
bound on 0.18 In the simulations reported below, the strength of the
bequest motive is indicated by B and the corresponding bequest/consumption—15—
ratio (G/C1) that would result under access to fair annuities,
given the other assumedparameters.
The strategy used to represent the market for private annuities




In the simulations reported below, the values used for D include zero,
all four values shown in the top line of Table 3 for the expected yield
differential offered by the ten largest insurers (ranging from —2.43%
to —6.13%), and the smallest differential shown in Table 3 (-.95%, for
the highest yield offered by any company in Best's sample, compared to
the Government bond yield and based on actual company experience mortality
probabilities). Because these yield differentials are large enough in
some cases to induce an individual to want to act as if he were the
insurer by issuing rather than holding annuities against his own life —
thatis, in effect short-selling the annuity contract by issuing debt
on which repayment (adjusted by his survival probability) is contingent
on his own survival —anonnegativity constraint is imposed in all
simulations.
Table 4 summarizes the results of three sets of simulations of the
model, based on different combinations of these assumed values of UandD.
In each simulation the assumed time preference parameter is a =.99,the
assumed market interest rate is R =1.01,the assumed coefficient of
relative risk aversion is=4,the assumed fraction of wealth mandatorily
invested in actuarially fair social annuities is S =.5,and the assumedTABLE 4
THEDEMANDFOR PRIVATE ANNUITIES




Age 65:0=o .00% 50.00%50.00%50.00% .00% .00% .00%
1 .89 42.79 42.24 39.39 .00 .00 .00
5 1.34 39.53 38.71 34.50 .00 .00 .00
10 1.59 37.75 36.77 31.80 .00 .00 .00
25 2.00 34.99 33.76 27.59 .00 .00 .00
50 2.38 32.57 31.11 23.84 .00 .00 .00
100 2.83 29.84 28.09 19.56 .00 .00 .00
Age 70:0=0 .00% 50.00%50.00%50.00% .00% .00% .00%
1 .89 41.45 41.07 39.94 .00 .00 .00
5 1.34 37.67 37.09 35.39 .00 .00 .00
10 1.59 35.63 34.94 32.93 .00 .00 .00
25 2.00 32.48 31.62 29.09 .00 .00 .00
50 2.38 29.75 28.72 25.72 .00 .00 .00
100 2.83 26.71 25.45 21.92 .00 .00 .00
Age 75: 0=0 .00% 50.00%50.00%50.00%50.00%50.00% .00%
1 .89 39.71 39.43 38.75 36.99 36.75 .00
5 1.34 35.28 34.85 33.83 31.21 30.84 .00
10 1.59 32.93 32.41 31.17 28.07 27.65 .00
25 2.00 29.34 28.67 27.11 23.23 22.71 .00
50 2.38 26.26 25.46 23.60 19.02 18.39 .00
100 2.83 22.86 21.89 19.68 14.30 13.57 .00
Notes: Values are present expected values as percentages of initial wealth.
Calculations are for males.
Assumed values are a=.99, R=l.0l, 3=4 and S=.5.-16-
mortality probabilities are those reported in the 1980 U.s. Life Tables.19
The upper panel of the table presents results based on morta]ity probabilities
for 65—year—old males, while the middle and lower panels present analogous
results for 70— and 75-year—old males, respectively.
For each set of assumed values, the solution of the model yields an
entire time series representing each year's consumption and each year's
division of privately held wealth (that is, wealth not mandatorily held in
social annuities) between bonds and private annuities 20 Given the
objectiveof this paper, however, Table 4 reportsfor each simulation only
theoptimal holding of private annuities at three specific ages, expressed
in each case as a percentage of total wealth.21 With one—half of total
wealth assumed to be held in social annuities, and with the nonnegativity
constraint imposed, the range of possible values of the share of wealth
held in private annuities is from zero to 50%.
The results shown in Table 4 suggest that, within the empirically
relevant range of variation for either D or 0, demand for individual
life annuities is sensitive both to the cost of annuities and to the
bequest motive. If annuities are actuarially fair and there isnobequest
motive, (that is, with D =0=0),theoptimal solution to the maximization
problem posed in Section II calls for stabilizing the lifetime consumption
stream completely by investing all of privately held wealth in private
annuities, so that A =50.00%.Either a negative yield differential or
a positive bequest motive makes annuities less attractive. The results
summarized in the table show how variations in D or 0, or both, reduce A
fromthe 50.00% reference point.
Theseresults suggest not only that the cost of annuities is a key—17—
part of the explanation for the small participation in the market for
individual life annuities, but also that the adverse selection element
is a crucial part of that cost. Given the near absence of individual
annuity purchases, the real question at issue in these simulations is what
combinations of D and 0 are sufficient to drive optimal annuity holdings
to no more than a trivially small percentage of initial wealth. For 65—year-
old males, for example, none of the values of 0 shown in Table 4 does so
in the absence of a negative expected yield differential. By contrast,
for each of the three largest (in absolute value) values of D considered,
the optimal portfolio allocation decision is to buy no private annuities at
all —regardlessof the presence or absence of a bequest motive. Reference
to Table 3 indicates that D =-2.43%,the largest value considered at
which it is optimal to hold any private annuities at all, is the differential
faced by an individual who knows that his mortality probabilities are like
those of other annuity purchasers rather than the general population, and
for whom the Government bond yield represents the opportunity cost of
funds. By contrast, D =-4.21%,the smallest value considered at which
it is optimal to hold no private annuities, is the differential faced by
a comparable individual without specific knowledge of his mortality
probabilities.
The results based on mortality probabilities for 70-year-old males
are essentially identical to those for 65—year-olds. For 75-year-olds,
however, the results differ in two interesting respects. First, for this
group positive private annuity holdings are optimal even at D =-4.21%
or -4.35% (although still not at -6.13%) .Second,at these larger yield
differentials, a bequest motive corresponding to a bequest/consumption ratio
of nearly three is sufficient to reduce optimal private annuity holdings to
less than 15% of initial wealth. A more modest bequest motive still leaves—18—
the optimal demand for private annuities implausibly large, however.
Although the simulation results summarized in Table 4 are sensitive
in at least some regard to each of the underlying assumptions, it is
especially interesting in this context to consider the implications of
an alternative assumption about the strength of individuals' risk aversion.
Because the basic purpose of an annuity is to insure against the consumption
risk associated with an uncertain lifetime, greater risk aversion
unambiguously implies a larger demand for annuities.
Table 5 therefore presents a corresponding set of results, identical
to those in Table 4 in every way except that the assumed coefficient of
relative risk aversion is=2.22As in the results based on=4in
Table 4, the demandforprivate annuities with =2appears to be
sensitivebothto the yield differential and to the strength of the bequest
mctive. For 65—year—olds, for example, at the same D =-2.43%considered
above, the optimal holding of private annuities varies from 50% of
total wealth for 0= 0to only 1% for 0= 10,corresponding to a bequest!
consumption ratio of 2.5. With a zero yield differential, 0= 50is
sufficient to reduce private annuity demand to only 12% of total wealth,
but the corresponding bequest/consumption ratio is implausibly high.23 The
results for 70-year-olds are again essentially identical. Finally, again
as in the results in Table 4, for 75-year-olds the combination of D =-2.43
and 0 =10(bequest/consumption ratio of 2.5) is sufficient to reduce
private annuity demand to just over 15% of wealth. Similarly, with a
bequest motive of this strength private annuity purchases are barely positive
for D =-4.21%and are zero for D =-4.35%.
In sum, during the early retirement years the cost of annuities,
as represented by the expected yield differential, appears to be aTABLE 5
THE DEMAND FOR PRIVATE ANNUITIES WITH LOW RISK AVERSION
Expected Yield Differential
Gw-x
Cw_x_i .00% —.95%—2.43%—4.21%—4.35% —6.13%
Age 65: 0=0 .00% 50.00%50.00% 50.00% .00% .00% .00%
1 .80 42.77 41.34 32.88 .00 .00 .00
51.79 34.93 31.88 14.01 .00 .00 .00
102.53 29.72 25.55 1.28 .00 .00 .00
254.01 20.75 14.60 .00 .00 .00 .00
505.67 12.41 4.36 .00 .00 .00 .00
1008.02 3.09 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
Age 70:0=0 .00% 50 .00%50.00%50.00% .00% .00% .00%
1 .80 41.5340.5037.38 .00 .00 .00
51.79 32.60 30.4323.86 .00 .00 .00
102.53 26.8023.8514.95 .00 .00 .00
254.01 17.1012.77 .00 .00 .00 .00
505.67 2.80 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
1008.02 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
Age75: 0=0 .00% 50.00%50.00%50.00%50.00%50.00% .00%
1 .80 39.92 39.12 37.25 32.16 31.43 .00
51.79 29.68 28.00 24.10 13.56 12.02 .00
102.53 23.2420.9715.71 1.61 .00 .00
254.01 12.77 9.52 1.96 .00 .00 .00
505.67 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
1008.02 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
Notes: Values are present expected values as percentages of initial wealth.
Calculations are for males.
Assumed values are a=.99, R=l.Ol, 3=2 and S=.5.—19—
sufficient explanation for the observed general absence of participation
in the individual life annuity market in the United States, for either
level of risk aversion. By contrast, at older ages a combination of the
cost of annuities and a positive bequest motive, acting in conjunction,
is necessary to provide an explanation for this phenomenon within the
context of the analytical framework applied here.—20—
IV.Conclusionsand Caveats
The fact that most elderly individuals in the United States choose
to maintain a flat age-wealth profile, rather than buy individual life
annuities, stands in contrast to central implications of the standard
life—cycle model of consumption-saving behavior. The analysis in this
paper lends support to an explanation for this phenomenon based either
on the cost of annuities, importantly including the cost element due
to adverse selection, or on the interaction of that cost and an intentional
bequest motive.
Expected yields offered on individual life annuities in the
United States are lower by 4.21-6.13%, or 2.43-4.35% after allowing
for adverse selection, than yields on alternative long—term fixed—
income investments. Simulations of an extended model of life-cycle
saving and portfolio behavior, allowing explicitly for uncertain
lifetimes and Social Security, show that yield differentials in this
range can account for the observed behavior, evenin the absence of a
bequest motive, during the early years of retirement. By contrast, at
older ages, the combination of yield differentials in this range and a
positive bequest motive can also do so.
As is usually the case with any initial analysis, caution is
appropriate in relying on these results without further research.
Although the model used in this analysis does generalize the standard
life cycle model in several potentially important ways, it still limits
the conclusiveness of the results by in effect excluding a priori three
further possible explanations for the observed behavior.24
First, informal discussions with insurers and financial advisors to
individuals suggest that many people choose stable age-wealth profiles, rather—21—
than eitherbuying annuitiesorsimplyconsuming out ofwealth, from
fearof the consequences of catastrophic illness. Although this
explanation seems to imply (counter to experience) that the introduction
of ?dicare should have changed the typical behavior in a readily visible
way, itis difficult to judge how much knowledge people actually have
aboutthe Jdicare program —or,indeed, how much confidence theyhave
init.
Second, the entire analysis here, as in most of the literature to
date, is inlicitly in real terms. By contrast, the individual life
annuities available in U.S. markets guarantee specified nominal payments.
Insurers often argue that they would find little market for a "real
annuity" if they marketed such an instrument, but (to the authors' knowledge)
the experinnt is untried.
Third, while the analysis here employs the standard theory of
expected utility ma.xiinization, evidence exists that apparently contradicts
this theory as a description of decision making under risk, especially when
the prospect of rare events is involved. In particular, individuals appear
systematically to overweight the probability of rare events25 The more
familiar implication of this psychological tendency is that it contributes
to the attractiveness of both gambling and insurance. In reverse, however,
it would also make annuities less desirable.
These further possible explanations for the fact that most of the
retiredelderly choose flat age—wealth profiles over purchases of individual
life annuities remain as objects for future research, so that the explanation
provided here in terms of actuarially unfair pricing (either with or
without a positive bequest motive) is necessarily tentative. Within the—22—
limits of the analysis carried out here, however, the conclusions reported
in this paper point clearly toward the importance of actuarially unfair
annuities.Footnotes
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1. The standard references are Modigliani and Bruniberg (1954) and Ando
and Modigliani (1963).
2. See, for example, Mirer (1979) and Hubbard (1983)
3. See, for example, Davies (1981)
4. The Retirement History Survey indicates thatonly 2% of the elderly
population own individual annuities of any sort; see for example,
Friedman and Sjogren (1980). A more specific examplemay further help
to illustrate the low level of activity in the individual lifeannuity
market,: One large insurer, considered to be more active thanaverage
in this market, sold an average of $18.5 million of individual life
annuities each year during 1980—83. By contrast, the samecompany's
annual sales of individual life insurance averaged $18.1 billion
during this period.
5. Kotlikoff and Summers (1981)
,forexample, have argued that intergenerational
transfers account for "the vast majority" of aggregate U.S. savings,
while life cycle saving accounts for "only a negligible fraction" of the
aggregate.
6. The expression used to calculate these yields is
w-x-l-t P = (l+r)
t=l
where P is the quoted per—dollar premium, w is the assumed maximum length
of life (here taken to be 110 years) ,xis the age at the date of issue
(here 65 years) ,ris the relevant interest rate, andis the
probability that an individual of age x at time t=1 will survive to
any year t>l. These annual calculations are then converted to a
monthly basis. The Appendix to Friedman and Warshawsky (1985) shows
that calculations for 65-year—old females, or for 70—year-old or 75-year—
old males, lead to results roughly similar to those for 65-year—old males.
7.The calculations rely on the 1970 tables for years 1968-70, on the 1980
tables for years 1980-83, and on both tables (weighted) for years 1971-79.
SeeFaber (1982) for a complete description of the U.S. Life Tables,
and Wetterstrand (1983) for a discussion of improvements in mortality
probabilities.8. The value of a 35-year certain annuity, calculated using the long—
term U.S. Government bond rate, exceeded the mean annuity premium
charged to 65—year—old males in all years of the sample except
1980, 1981 and 1982; see Friedman and Warshawsky (1985)
9. This dispersion probably reflects search costs; see, for example
Pratt et al. (1979) .Alternatively,it could reflect different
marketing choices by different insurers.
10. See Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) for an analysis of the behavior
underlying this kind of adverse selection.
11.See Society of Actuaries (1983) for the actual company experience tables.
12. In fact, Fischer's model is really an annuity model, despite his
application of it to the demand for life insurance.
13. Probabilities Pt and are, of course, conditional on initial age x.
Writing them as p(x)t and (x)1 would be appropriate but would clutter
an already cumbersome notation. Conditionality on x is to be understood,
here and below.
14. See Hakkanson (1969) for a discussion of the iso—elastic utility
function.
15.In a more general context it would also be necessary to take account
of labor income. Th focus of this paper, however, is on the elderly
retired population.
16. As in Fischer (1973), the assumption of one-period annuities makes the
analysis tractable. The annuities actually available for purchase in
the United States are instead life annuities.
17. The model as written here imposes no nonnegativity constraint on
choice paramter A —thatis, it does not explicitly preclude short
sales of annuities. The simulations reported in Section III below
impose A>0.
18. It is also possible, of course, to posit avarietyof circumstances
in which an altruistic individual may value his heirs' consumption
more than his own, so that 0 need not be bounded. In addition,
individuals may value bequests for non—altruistic reasons; see,
for example, Bernheim et al. (1984)
19. The assumptions ci. =.99and R =1.01follow Kotlikoff and Spivak
(1981) .Theassumption=4follows Bodie et al. (1985) ,and
corresponds to the evidence found by Grossman and Shiller (1981)
One-half is about the fraction of total wealth constituted by Social
Security for the average wealth constituted by Social Security for
the average retired elderly individual in the United States; see
Kotlikoff and Smith (1983) ,Table3.7.19 (p.127)
20. See Friedman and Warshawsky (1985) for illustrations of these time
paths in the case of fair annuities.21. Wealth held in annuity form is valued at the present expected value.
22. Friend and Blume (1975) found evidence indicating a relative risk
aversion coefficient roughly equal to 2.
23. For males Menchik and David (1982, p. 193, Table 1) reported a median
bequest equal to 2.1 times median annual labor income (defined as
one—fortieth of average annual labor earnings) ,anda mean bequest
equal to 4.2 times mean annual labor income.
24. An additional factor explored by Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981)
intergenerationalrisk sharing within families could also possibly
explain the &bsence of individual life annuity purchases, but not
the flat age—wealth profile.
25. See, for example,Kahneman and Tversky (1979).References
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